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AERIAL BOMBARDMENT OF CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY OBJECTIVES
FRANK E. QUINDRY*
Efforts toward universal peace have had opposing effects. At-
tempts have been made to outlaw war because it is uneconomical
and is the agency for saddling heavy burdens upon succeeding
generations, in addition to bringing temporary suffering and mental
anguish to the generations engaged therein. Men shudder at the
horrors of future conflicts and seek to avoid war as the only means
of saving civilization from a complete overthrow. The horrors of
the next great war, contemplated to destroy civilization and to bring
another era of "dark ages", arise from the realization that its
two main agencies will be; (1) the use of destructive gases, and
(2) aerial bombardment. Of these two agencies the latter is
regarded as the most significant, due to the fact that the gases may
be spread by use of airplanes over vast areas of productive and
inhabited country and explosives of great destructibility may be
dropped from the air upon defenseless cities and towns unless, by
reason of international agreements observed by combatant nations,
the future operations of aerial bombardment components of armed'
forces are restricted within some humane limits.
The purpose of this article is to call attention to recent at-
tempts at regulating aerial bombardment, and the difficulties en-
countered in arriving at any satisfactory rules, as well as to
suggest the most effective regulations commensurate with present
conceptions of military science, and the methods of enforcing
observance of such rules as may be adopted by the nations.
I.
Conditions Necessitating Regulations.
The first requisite of rules of warfare is that they be practic-
able and easily understood. Also they should aim to bring into
accord the views of the nations, based upon their varying phil-
osophies of war, and their notions of national defense, based upon
their sizes, geographic locations, industrial development, coloniza-
tion and foreign trade policies, and the offensive attitudes of neigh-
*Member of the Michigan Bar. Formerly pilot First Pursuit Group,
Selfridge Field. First Lieutenant, Air Corps Reserve, U. S. A.
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boring countries. These principles demand utmost consideration
in the adoption of any rules in order to lessen the likelihood of their
being violated because of unforseen exigencies in a future major
conflict.
During the Great War there was considerable divergence of
opinion between the Central Powers and the Allies as to what were
legitimate means and objects of attacks. The German aerial opera-
tions were in keeping with their philosophy of war which is
expressed by Clausewitz thus: "In war the use of force is absolute;
all concessions to humanity, except as expedience dictates, are a
weakness calculated to delay the end, and thus intensify the sum
of human suffering."1 The German War Book states that "War
is waged not merely with the hostile combatants but also with
the inanimate military resources of the enemy. This includes not
only the fortresses but also every town and every village which
is an obstacle to military progress. All can be besieged and bom-
barded, stormed or destroyed, if they are defended by the enemy
and in some cases even if they are only occupied."' 2 And further
it states that "A prohibition by international law of the bombard-
ment of open towns and villages which are not occupied by the
enemy, or defended, was, indeed, put into words by the Hague
Regulations, but appears superfluous, since modern military his-
tory knows of hardly any such case." 3
In the first month of the war German bombs fell on Antwerp
without careful aiming at any objective of military importance, and
on August 30, 1914, Paris was bombed in the same indiscriminate
manner. Similar raids were carried out against.other French towns,
most of the casualties being among civilians. 4 The Germans sought
not only to destroy important military bases but also to weaken
the morale of the French and English civilian populations, the re-
sult desired being to bring about internal coercive pressure against
the governments of the Allies. The moral effect attained partially
justified the reasons for the indiscriminate bombing since it brought
about severe criticism by the civilians of their own governments
and their own air forces.5 However, the attempt to weaken the
civilian morale by bombardment from the air brought about a resull
1. F. N. Maude, "The Bombardment of Open Towns," in the Cont-
temporary Review, Sept., 1918, 114:275.
2. J. H. Morgan, The War Book of the German General Staff, 1915,
p. 103.
3. Ibid., p. 108.
4. M. W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment, 1928, pp. 175-177.
5. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, 1924, pp. 9-11.
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opposite from that desired. It added seriously to the already
unfavorable public sentiment toward Germany, particularly in the
United States, and it incurred greater hatred and bitterness on the
part of the civilians who were exposed to the bombardment.6 But
the air attacks against London and Paris did result in a distinct
military advantage to Germany.7  In order to defend these cities
large numbers of men and great quantities of fighting equipment
were retained at home, thus reducing the enemy opposition in the
theatre of operations.8 Whether Germany could have achieved the
desired results of a general crushing of civilian morale if more
aerial equipment had been available is purely conjectural.
The rules of the British and American manuals of war ex-
pressly condemned the German view and followed the Hague rules.9
Article 25 of the Hague Rules Relative to Bombardment in Land
War provides: "The attack or bombardment, by any means what-
ever, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is for-
bidden." Number twelve of the Rules of Land Warfare of the
United States Army, 1917, provided that military necessity ad-
mitted the direct destruction of life or limb of armed forces and
also of other persons where such destruction was unavoidable. It
further allowed the destruction of property, and the obstruction
of lines of communication and the withholding of sustenance or
means of life of the enemy.1
Allied bombardment of German towns continued from the raid
on Dusseldorf in September, 1914, followed by others on Cologne,
Freiburg and several hundred other centers of industry in the
Rhineland and Saar districts and the Lorraine-Luxemburg regions,
throughout the war." Their activities seem to have been governed
by the value of the target from the point of view of military sig-
nificance. 12 The moral effect produced among the German people
6. "Mr. Wilson's Hint to European Bomb Droppers," in the Literary
Digest, Dec. 12, 1914, 49:1161.
7. Bombardment Aviation, Air Corps Tactical School text, Feb., 1931,
p. 12.
8. J. M Spaight, op cit., pp. 10, 202. Bombardment Aviation, op cit.,
pp. 12-13.
9. James W. Garner, The German War Code, 1918, p. 27.
10. Charles C0ianey Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as interpreted
and Applied by the United States, 1922, Vol. II, p. 300.
11. M. W". Royse, op. cit., pp. 183-184. Aeroplanes Caproni, Official
Communiques, Bombarding Actions, August, 1915-28 Feb., 1918.
12. J. M. Spaight, op. cit., pp. 198-200. M. W. Royse, op. cit., p. 193,
"In general one principle seems to have been followed in the war: that
military objectives could be bombed wherever found, regardless of their
location, and it seems regardless of the injury to non-combatants and private
property."
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who were in the proximity of the air raids resulted in a military
advantage to the Allies in addition to the disablement of German
industrial material. It created a demand for international agree-
ments to restrict aerial bombardment of cities and brought pressing
demands upon the German military staff for protection. The
populations in large areas over which raids were conducted were
terrified to the point of panic even though the objectives were no-
where near them. 13 The tangible results of the moral effect are
listed in the report of the G-2 Section of the General Staff of the
A. E. F. In addition to the huge cost of defending German cities
with searchlights, anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns "there
was a loss of production in almost every factory city that was
bombed or that is in the vicinity of a city which was bombed,"
bonuses had to be paid to employees to induce them to remain at
the factories, "the morale of the fighting forces as well as that of
the civilion population was lowered by the air raids," and "a great
deal of inconvenience was caused to the enemy, such as the con-
gestion of railroad traffic, which cannot be expressed in terms of
money." 14
Aerial warfare serves a commander differently from the other
weapons at his disposal and it seems inevitable that its use will
bring about changes in the conduct of war generally. Statements
of Marshall Foch illustrate the changing methods of warfare:
"On one side: intensive use of human masses fired by strong feel-
ings, absorbing every activity of society and conforming to their
needs the material parts of the system, such as fortification, sup-
plies, use of ground, armaments, encampments, etc.
"On the other side, the 18th century side: regular and meth-
odical use of these material parts which became the foundation of
various systems, differing of course with time but aiming always
to control the use of troops, in order to preserve the army, property
of the sovereign, indifferent to the cause for which it fights but
not without some professional qualities, especially as regards mili-
tary spirit and tradition."'1
That Foch realized another change was about to occur is in-
dicated by his declaring that "The potentialities of aircraft attack
on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such
attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress
13. J. M. Spaight, op. cit., p. 11.
14. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 14.
15. Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, translated by J. de Mor-
inni, p. 32.
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public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus
becoming decisive."1  The plans of the Allies for a huge aerial
offensive in 1919 is further indication of the adoption of a changed
plan of warfare.'17 It is to be noticed in the later statement made
by Foch that he attaches importance to. aerial attack for the pur-
pose of weakening the morale among civilians of the enemy nation.
He evidently considered that the use of aircraft on a large scale
for this purpose could facilitate the sudden delivery of a blow
which might conceivably defeat the enemy government before it
had an opportunity to mobilize its armed forces.
The necessity for establishing rules of international law gov-
erning aerial bombardments arises from the divergence of views
of nations and of individuals within the nations. There is no
dispute that military objectives are the legitimate subjects of aerial
attack. The differences in opinion arise from the attempts to define
"military objectives." O~ie view is that only those things directly
connected with the operations of military forces are proper ob-
jectives, and civilians within the immediate vicinity of such targets
are likewise subject to bombardment, due to practical considera-
tions. Another view is grounded on the proposition that all na-
tional resources, even those remotely connected with the military
operations, are military objectives and the civilian population must
necessarily suffer. This latter view is enforced by the present
tendency of conscription of all resources by the various nations in
the event of war.
The difficulty in promulgating rules and regulations agreeable
to the conflicting views is best expressed by a supplemental note
of the Report of the Commission of Jurists which reads :18 "The
subject of bombardment by aircraft is one of the most difficult
to deal with in framing any code of rules for aerial warfare. The
experiences of the recent war have left in the mind of the world
at large a lively horror of the havoc which can be wrought by the
16. Lord Thomson, Air Facts and Problems, 1927, p. 32. Cf. "Con-
sultation de M. W. Royse," La Protection des Populations Civiles Contre
Les Bombardments, Geneve, 1930, p. 85.
17. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 15. Winston S. Churchill, "Shall
We Commit Suicide," pamphlet reprinted from Nashe's Pall Mall Magazine,
Sept. 24, 1924, "The campaign of the year 1919 would have witnessed an
immense accession to the power of destruction. Had the Germans retained
the morale to make good their retreat to the Rhine, they would have been
assaulted in the summer of 1919 with forces and by methods incomparably
more prodigious than any yet employed. Thousands of aeroplanes would
have shattered their cities
18. "General Report of the Commission of Jurists at the Hague," in
supplement of American Journal of International Law, 1923, 17:250.
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indiscriminate launching of bombs and projectiles on the non-com-
batant populations of towns and cities. The conscience of mankind
revolts against this form of making war in places outside the actual
theatre of operations and the feeling is universal that limitations
must be imposed.
"On the other hand, it is equally clear that aircraft is a potent
engine of war, and no state which realizes the possibility that it
may itself be attacked, and the use to which its adversary may
put his air forces can take the risk of fettering its own liberty of
action to an extent which would restrict it from attacking its enemy
where that adversary may legitimately be attacked with effect. It
is useless, therefore, to enact prohibitions unless there is an equally
clear understanding of what constitutes legitimate objects of at-
tack, and it is precisely in this respect that agreement was difficult
to reach."
II.
Natural Influences Restricting Indiscriminate Aerial Bombing
Practical considerations make it inevitable that civilians and
private property within the immediate vicinity of a bombardment
objective will be subject to destruction. This has been proven
not only by the operations of aerial bombardment units in the
Great War where inaccuracy was flagrant, but by the experiences
of artillery where guns firing at ranges of twenty-five miles and
more could not possibly be expected to hit the target with even a
high percentage of the shells fired. There are, however, certain
limiting influences to the use to which a commander will put his
destructive means. The most important of these influences are
what are known as principles of war, though not "principles" in
the strict sense of the term. They are conclusions based on the
experiences of successful commanders throughout history of the
better practices of conducting a war. Exact definitions would not
be practicable for they must be interpreted in the light of history.
However, certain of these principles must be considered in the
abstract with reference to aerial bombardment.
A fundamental principle of war is explained by Marshall
Foch as follows: "In war everything is co-related. Every move
has some reason, seeks some object, once that object is determined
it decides the nature and importance of the means to be employed." 19
It is more easily understood by calling it the singleness of the ob-
19. Ferdinand Foch, op. cit., p. 18.
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jective, which means that one chief result must be aimed at and
deviation therefrom or vacillation may bring about defeat. The
ultimate object is the restoration of peace on satisfactory terms.2 1
In the attainment of the object of war Clausewitz says: "to employ
all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy.
In every modification which manifests itself in these respects, there
is a shortcoming as respects the object. Even if the result is toler-
ably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to use the utmost
efforts to make it perfectly certain; for these efforts can never
produce injurious effects. Let the country suffer ever so much by
it no disadvantage can arise from that, because the pressure of the
War is sooner removed."' 21 Even though one country might pos-
sess a large air force and the opposing nation none at all, a resort
to indiscriminate aerial bombardment among civilians would be a
dispersion of effort contrary to the principle of singleness of the
objective which demands that all efforts be concerted toward a
definite goal.
The dispersion of effort also violates another principle of war.
it is called economy of forces. Marshall Foch explains it as fol-
lows: "If you said that it is the art of spending one's forces, of
not dispersing one's forces, you would only say a part of the truth.
You might come nearer to it if you defined it as the art of knowing
how to spend, of spending to good purpose, of drawing all possible
advantage from the resources at hand."22  Consequently, even
though a nation possessed an unlimited air force it would not be
good policy to use it without regard to obtaining maximum results.
In addition to this, regardless of the strength of a single nation
it is probable that it will never have enough bombardment equip-
ment to strike all targets. Necessity demands that it be used in
close accordance with the principle of economy of forces and di-
rected only at vital objectives. 23 In the history of maritime warfare
coastal cities, even though they contain a large percentage of the
total population of various countries, have not suffered from in-
discriminate bombardment in spite of the development of long range
guns, due to such natural influences.24
The use of gas in aerial warfare, however, may negate the
20. F. Maurice, Principles of Strategy, 1930, p. 68.
21. Von Clausewitz, On War, translated by J. J. Graham, 1911, Vol.
III, pp. 209-210.
22. Ferdinand Foch, op. cit., p. 50.
23. Bombardinent Aviation, op. cit., p. 69.
24. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and the Cities, 1930, pp. 164-165.
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restriction of economy of forces somewhat. 25  Lewisite gas, which
is very deadly, will undoubtedly be used, as will mustard gas which
causes severe burns.2" These gases are heavier than air so that
they will penetrate the deepest cellars and mines. A combination
of demolition bombs and mustard gas would make rehabilitation
of rail centers or important factories impossible for days follow-
ing the attack. Gas can be manufactured in great quantities in a
short time.27 An attempt was made by the treaty concluded at
Washington in 1922 to prohibit "the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases or other analogous liquids." The treaty
has been ratified by the United States, the British Empire, Italy
and Japan, but France indicates strongly that she will not accede
to it, thus making it ineffective for any of the others. France's
objection, however, appears to be on account of the presence of the
submarine prohibition clause, because she has ratified the Geneva
Protocol To Prohibit the Use of Poisonous Gases and Bacteriolog-
ical Methods of Warfare, promulgated on June 17, 1925, which has
already been ratified by twenty-seven nations. But the United
States is not a party to the Geneva Protocol. So far as the United
States is concerned, there exists no rule or regulation prohibiting
the use of poisonous gases in warfare. However, since this country
has expressed its national policy in the treaty of 1922, it will not
exercise the initiative in the use of gas, 28 but will probably use it
in case of reprisals, since it is available through an extensive Chem-
ical Warfare Service, which is in disregard of the spirit of the con-
vention.29
But even if gas should be used in facilitating destruction over
wide areas, there is still another principle of war which will ex-
ercise a restraining influence on the use of bombardment aviation.
This is the principle of public opinion. Although the result aimed
at may be the crushing of the morale of the enemy civilian popula-
tion, still the effect may be to harden the resistance of the nation
attacked. Due to the great number of citizens of neutral nations
dwelling in all important urban centers, the complications certain
to arise from indiscriminate bombing are perhaps the most potent
deterrent. The loss of a friendly neutral power is too great a
25. M. W. Royse, op. cit., p. 216.
26. Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare, 1922, pp.
22-23, 380.
27. Ibid., 380.
28. Lectures on International Aerial Regulations, 1930-1931, Air Corps
Tactical School.
29. M. W. Royse, op. cit., p. 219.
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sacrifice for a combatant nation to hazard. In the Great War public
opinion in the United States was turned against Germany by her
misdeeds in marching through Belgium and in resorting to un-
restricted submarine warfare 0
A further restraint is the fear of reprisals and counter re-
prisals which, unfortunately, are sanctioned by international law
and which may take any form of warfare, regardless of that ap-
plied by the enemy.
In addition to the restrictions already mentioned there will al-
way exist certain mechanical obstacles, either in the limitation of
the offensive machinery or in the development of new defensive
mechanism. For example, the present bombardment airplane is
limited to a radius-of-action of four hundred miles and its speed
and bomb-load capacity are restricted. Judging from recent trans-
oceanic flights, it may be expected that the radius-of-action will be
increased. And it is rumored that various defenses in the form
of electric rays for acting upon the ignition system of motors,"1
gases which will prevent combustion in the cylinders of motors,
artificial fogs, and gas neutralizing agencies have been developed.
3 2
. III
Attempts to Regulate the Conduct of War
The movement toward alleviating the sufferings of individuals
in war striken areas gained its first impetus when M. Duvant, a
physician in Geneva, having witnessed the horrors of the battlefield
at Solferino, exerted his efforts to bring about the first Geneva
Convention in 1864. This convention dealt only with the treatment
of wounded, laying down humane rules. of battle."
The First Hague Conference in 1899 was the first to deal di-
rectly with aerial bombardment. A prohibition for a period of five
years was declared against the-discharge of projectiles or explosives
from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature. A like
declaration was prepared at the Second Hague Conference in 1907.
It was to be in force until the close of the Third Hague Confer-
ence, which has never been held. A number of States signed it
and before the outbreak of the European War it had been ratified
or acceded to by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Great Britain,
30. F. Maurice, op. cit., p. 28.
31. Weber's Weekly, Chicago, June 14, 1924.
32. Chicago Herald-Examiner, August 2, 1931.
33. W. P. Morras, "War and the Law of Nations," in the Lakeside
Monthly, Sept., 1872, 8:163.
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Haiti, Siberia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Portugal, Salvador, Siam, Switzerland and the United
States. However, since the convention was not binding on any
of the contracting States where any of the belligerents were not
parties thereto, it was not effective during the Great War. The
universal employment of aerial warfare during that conflict has
established beyond question the legitimacy of such practice.
8 4
The Hague rules were adopted at a time when aviation for mili-
tary purposes was considered of little practical value. In 1899 air-
planes were looked upon as flights of the imagination and as having
little chance to succeed, even though gliders had been flown for
many years. Balloons had been in existence for over one hundred
years but they could not be used for bombing because, being de-
pendent upon the wind, they were uncontrolable and could not
be returned to their own forces upon completion of a bombard-
ment mission. However, in the case of the glider, all that was
lacking was a propelling device which would make it practical as
a machine of destruction.3 5 The ostensible reason for the Hague
rules regarding aerial bombardment was that the inaccuracy of such
bombing would result in injury to objects disconnected with the
conflict.3 6 But the real reason was very probably the impractica-
bility of military aviation at that time, and the fact that is was in
such an experimental and uncertain stage that the Powers were
content to wait until it was developed more fully. 7 This is evi-
denced by the five year limitation period in the First Hague Con-
vention of 1899, the further period of limitation imposed by the
Second Hague Convention in 1907 and the lack of unanimous
ratification by the States represented therein, and the tactics which
were actually employed during the Great War in aerial operations.
The foundation for the present conception of rules of war-
fare is to be found in the Brussels Convention of 1874.8 It pro-
vided that: "fortified places alone could be beseiged. Towns, ag-
glomerations of houses or villages which are open and undefended,
cannot be attacked or bombarded."3 9  However, the distinction
drawn between those towns which were fortified and those which
were not was not based merely upon humanitarian reasons. At that
34. G. D. Nokes and H. P. Bridges, The Law of Aviation, 1930, p. 131.
35. M. W. Royce, op. cit., p. 33.
36. Arthur K. Kuhn, "International Aerial Navigation and the Peace
Conference," in the American Journal of International Law, 1920, 14:369.
37. M. W. Royse, op. cit., p. 50.
38. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
39. Official Documents, in the American Journal of International Law,
April, 1907.
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period land warfare was of a much different character than it was
in the recent war." The defenses consisted of a chain of fortresses
and fortified cities, and for the invader to be successful he had first
to break this defense by storm and seige of the key fortresses.
Generally, therefore, the bulk of the population was left relatively
unmolested because they presented no primary military objective.
Unfortified cities were not attacked because they were not of suf-
ficient military importance, and all that was necessary to take them
was to march in without the necessity of resorting to bombard-
ment.
4 1
The Hague Conference of 1907 indicates a different view of
bombardment from that taken by the Brussels Conference. Arti-
cle 1 of the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting Bombardment
by Naval Forces in Time of War provides: "The bombardment
by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings is forbidden." Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Rules Rela-
tive to Bombardment in Land War similarly provides: "The at-
tack or bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden." The test
of immunity from bombardment adopted at the Brussels Confer-
ence in 1874, namely, whether or not the place was fortified,42 was
discarded, because at the end of the nineteenth century warfare
no longer centered about fortified cities. Increased ranges in guns
and the development of field tactics had taken the place of seiges
and storms of fortified units, and towns and places of no previous
tactical importance had assumed positions vital to the military situa-
tion.4 3
That the test of "undefended" was inadequate, particularly for
air warfare, was clearly shown by the results of military opera-
tions during the Great War. The defense against aerial attack is
not primarily dependent upon anti-aircraft artillery and machine
guns on the ground, but is probably more dependent upon counter-
aerial attacks by the defended locality's pursuit planes which patrol
and strive to protect vast territories. Consequently, even though
a town has no ground defenses, the fact that aerial defenses are
available makes it, technically, a defended town.44  But this does
not mean that the defense airplanes can prevent the enemy air
40. M. W. Royse, op. ct., p. 155.
41. Ibid., p. 151.
42. Official Documents, loc. cit.
43. M. W. Royse, op. cit., p. 156.
44. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, 1924, p. 197.
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force from getting through to its objective even though the de-
fense has, for the time being in that locality, what is called "con-
trol of the air." Control of the air means that the side having
superiority in aerial strength can successfully repel most of the
enemy attempts at aerial invasion and can reasonably ensure success
of its own missions over the territory of the enemy. However,
even when they do not have control of the air, enemy airplanes
can get through to their objectives by taking cover of darkness,
meteorological and physical conditions, and by daring flights. Re-
gardless of the amount of aerial power that can be amassed on
one side, the vastness of the air makes it impossible to block all
enemy aerial operations. 45  Consequently, it is evident that the test
of "undefended" is inadequate as applied to aerial warfare, for
in spite of a strong aerial defense, the enemy cannot be completely
prevented from bombing otherwise defenseless objectives.
During the Great War aerial attacks by both the Allies and
the Central Powers were made on many places and towns unde-
fended by ground forces within the precept of the Hague rules.
It apparently made little difference whether or not they were de-
fended.4 6 "It appears that each of the belligerents selected bombard-
ment objectives at considerable distances to the rear of the enemy's
advanced positions. They included principally, lines of communica-
tion, industrial centers, and to some extent airdromes. The press-
ure of the ground situation in vital stages throughout the war often,
of necessity, diverted attacks from the former objectives to those in
the immediate combat zones of the ground forces. It was recog-
nized, however, that bombardment aviation could contribute most
to the general situation by bombing the vital objectives upon which
the ground troops were dependent for transportation and fabrica-
tion of supplies."4 7
At the Washington Conference in 1921-1922 an attempt was
made to place a limitation upon aircraft. The attempt failed be-
cause, as was pointed out by the committee appointed to consider
it, civilian as well as military aircraft possess military value, and
a nation's air force is dependent upon the commercial aircraft in-
dustry for its airplanes. Since it is not practicable to restrict com-
mercial enterprises, it was found impossible to satisfactorily limit the
air forces of nations. 48 "The only result was the resolution adopted
by the Conference providing for the future setting up of a com-
45. Squadron Leader, Basic Principles of Air Warfare, 1927, pp. 12-13.
46. 1. M. Spaight, op. cit., pp. 195-211.
47. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 11.
48. M. W. Royse, op. cit., pp. 206-208.
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mission to consider: '(1) whether existing rules of international
law adequately covered "new methods of attack or defense re-
sulting from the introduction or development, since the Hague Con-
ference of 1907, of new agencies of warfare"; and, if they did not,
(2) "what changes in the existing rules" ought in consequence to
be adopted as a part of the law of nations.' 24
When the Commission of Jurists met at the Hague in 1922-
1923 they naturally looked to the results of the Great War in their
attempt to formulate rules for aerial bombing. The outstanding
feature of those aerial activities was the claim of each belligerent
that the places bombed were military objectives. Consequently, that
term was made the test in their rules of the legitimacy of aerial
bombardment targets.5" This indicates a new development in war-
fare. We have already observed how the test laid down in the
Brussels Convention of 1874 was embodied in the word "unforti-
fied" and how the word "undefended" was substituted by the Hague
Rules of 1907.
"There were four main viewpoints which the commission took
of the work before it: (1) humanitarian; (2) national point of
view of the respective delegations; (3) the juridic point of view
with regard to the laws of war; (4) the combatant point of view
with regard to the conduct of war, in which the combatant services
considered their respective nations both as neutral and as belliger-
ent."' 1  "The Commission as a whole was of the opinion that the
draft of a war code governing aviation should not contravene in
principle or in any important respect the rules already governing
other forms of warfare by land and sea, but should extend the
accepted principles of aviation so that the laws of war might be
a unity in applying to all kinds of agencies of war. . . . The
essential thing was that the belligerent effort should be directed
against objectives whose damage or distruction was in accordance
with the principles of warfare already accepted. ' 52 "With regard
to the revision of the laws of war from the humanitarian point of
view, all nations and all members of each delegation were agreed
that it was desirable that the laws of war should be such as to pre-
vent suffering of persons or destruction of private property, ex-
49. Ibid., pp. 210-211. Win. L. Rodgers, "The Laws of War Con-
cerning Aviation and Radio," in the American Journal of International Law,
1923, 17:629.
50. General Report of the Commission of Jurists at the Hague, Article
23, paragraph 1, loc. cit.
51. Win. L. Rodgers, loc. cit., p. 632.
52. Ibid., p. 635.
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cept such as was inevitable for the accomplishment of the war ob-
jective. 53
The following Rules of Aerial Warfare were recommended by
the Commission :54
"Article 22. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terror-
izing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private
property not of military character, or of injurying non-combatants
is prohibited.
"Article 23. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of enforcing
compliance with requisitions in kind or payment of contributions
in money is prohibited.
"Article 24. (1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when
directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of which
the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military ad-
vantage to the belligerent.
(2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed ex-
clusively at the following objectives: military forces; military
works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting im-
portant and well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of
arms, ammunition or distinctly military supplies; lines of com-
munication or transportation used for military purposes.
(3) Bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or build-
ings not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land
forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives specified in
paragraph 2 are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded with-
out the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the
aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
(4) In the immediate neigborhood of the operations of land
forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable pre-
sumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to
justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused
to the civilian population.
(5) A belligerent state is liable to pay compensation for in-
juries to person or to property caused by the violation by any of
its officers or forces of the provisions of this article.
"Article 25. In bombardment by aircraft, all necessary steps
must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible build-
ings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable pur-
poses, historic monuments, hospital ships, hospitals and other places
53. Ibid., p. 632.
54. General Report of the Commission of Jurists at the Hague, loc. cit.
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where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such buildings,
objects or places are not at the time used for military purposes.
Such buildings, objects and places must by day be indicated by
marks visible to aircraft. The use of marks to indicate other
buildings, objects, or places than those specified above is to be
deemed an act of perfidy. The marks used as aforesaid shall be
in the case of buildings protected under the Geneva Convention
the red cross on a white ground and in the case of other protected
buildings a large rectangular panel divided diagonally into two
pointed triangular portions, one black and the other white.
"A belligerent who desires to secure-by night the protection for
the hospitals and other privileged buildings above mentioned must
take the necessary measures to render the special signs referred
to sufficiently visible.
"Article 26. The following special rules are adopted for the
purpose of enabling states to obtain more efficient protection for
important historic monuments situated within their territory, pro-
vided that they are willing to refrain from the use of such monu-
ments and a surrounding zone for military purposes, and to accept
a special regime for their inspection.
(1) A state shall be entitled, if it sees fit, to establish a zone of
protection round such monuments situated in its territory. Such
zones shall in time of war enjoy immunity from bombardment.
(2) The monuments round which a zone is to be established
shall be notified to the other Powers in peace time through the
diplomatic channel; the notification may not be withdrawn in time
of war.
(3) The zone of protection may include, in addition to the
area actually occupied by the monument or group of monuments,
an outer zone, not exceeding 500 meters in width, measured from
the circumference of the said area.
(4) Marks clearly visible from aircraft either by day or by
night will be employed for the purpose of ensuring the identifica-
tion by belligerent airmen of the limits of the zones.
(5) The marks on the monuments themselves will be those
defined in Article 25. The marks employed for indicating the sur-
rounding zones will be fixed by each state adopting the provisions
of this article, and will be notified to other Powers at the same time
as the monuments and zones are notified.
(6) Any abusive use of the marks indicating the zones re-
ferred to in paragraph 5 will be regarded as an act of perfidy.
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(7) A state adopting the provisions of this article must abstain
from using the monument and the surrounding zone for military
purposes, or for the benefit in any way whatever of its military
organization, or from committing within such monument or zone
any act with a military purpose in view.
(8) An inspection committee consisting of three neutral rep-
resentatives accredited to the state adopting the provisions of this
article, or their delegates, shall be appointed for the purpose of
ensuring that no violation is committed of the provisions of para-
graph 7. One of the members of the committee of inspection shall
be the .representative (or his delegate) of the state to which has
been entrusted the interests of the opposing belligerent."
The adoption of the test of the "military objective" has been
looked upon with approval. 55 However, as we have seen in com-
paring the German and Allied notions of military objectives, the
great difficulty comes in defining the term satisfactorily to all con-
cerned. The commission attempts to define it in Article 24, para-
graph 2. But this definition seems too narrow, since it does not
include objectives which were considered legitimate during the
Great War and which, under present conceptions of the methods of
warfare and the immense and complex organization required to
conduct a war, will necessarily be vital to the military situation.
During the Great War an aqueduct north-west of Constantinople,
supplying water to the city, was bombed. Other objectives were
blast furnaces, a boot factory, electric works, power stations and
installations, gasworks and gas conduits, grain silos, iron works
and foundries, magneto works, mercury mines, motor works, oil
tanks, petroleum or benzol depots and refineries and wells, a post
office, steel works, a sulphur factory, warehouses, a water reservoir,
waterworks, and "industrial zones" and factories without specifica-
tion as to the precise nature of the objectives. 0 None of the above
would be permitted under Article 24, paragraph 2. Paragraph 3
of the same article is satisfactory as far as humanitarianism is con-
cerned, but it does not take into account the practical considera-
tions of warfare. The populations of large cities are almost en-
tirely dependent upon the existence therein of the great factories
55. James W. Garner, "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial
Warfare," American Journal of International Law, 1924, 18:56. Elbridge
Colby, "Laws of Aerial Warfare," 10 Minnesota Law Review 323, March,
1926. But see Paul Whitcomb Williams, "Legitimate Targets in Aerial
Bombardment," in the American Journal of International Law, July, 1929,
23:574. J. M. Spaight, "The Doctrine of Air Force Necessity," in British
Year Book of International Law, 1925, p. 4.
56. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, 1924, pp. 233-235.
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and other industries. One such business may employ several thou-
sands of civilians who must necessarily live in the vicinity of it.
The great industries are the most important to a nation in produc-
ing the machines of destruction or in producing the machinery
which in turn makes the weapons of war. No large city will be
without them. Its population could not exist without them. At
the same time, the destruction of those industries will necessarily
be vital to the military situation. Consequently, on the basis of
self-preservation alone, no nation will refrain from attacking such
objectives merely because they are surrounded by enemy civilian
population. This will make indiscriminate bombing inevitable.
All of Articles 24, 25, and 26 are subject to an extremely
potent objection, namely, the danger of reprisals which in turn
would lead to counter-reprisals and eventually to a degenerated
method of warfare wherein no rules would prevail except those
imposed by self-preservation motives, and barbarity would be the
only outcome. As we have seen, the nations will not be kept within
the bounds imposed by the Commission's definition of a military
objective, nor will they refrain from attacking places vital to the
military situation because of the danger to civilians in the immediate
vicinity. Violations which would be sure to ensue if these rules
were put in force would undoubtedly call forth reprisals.
Article 25 provides for the sparing of certain classes of places.
During a bombardment mission it will frequently be impracticable
to discriminate in their favor unless they are far removed from the
vicinity of the objective, even if they are marked as provided in
both Articles 25 and 26. The pilot of the bombardment plane will
be too much absorbed in maneuvering for position, and will usually
be in the gravest of danger from enemy aircraft and anti-aircraft
machinery. In a fight, particularly when his life is in danger and
killing is the order of things, a man is not his normal self. Even
though he may think calmly he is working under a tension which
makes him an insane person as compared to what his mental con-
dition would be if he could deliberately and carefully and without
personal danger set about his task. It is extremely unlikely, there-
fore, that there would not be some infractions of the rules sufficient
to impel the enemy to retaliate in probably a worse violation of
the rules of warfare.
It seems almost needless to point out that Article 23 is of little
avail. It is an attempt to adapt an obsolete rule of naval warfare
to a phase of aerial warfare which practically cannot exist, or
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which is at least very unlikely to ever occur, since the airplanes
would have no means of enforcing compliance with requisitions.
IV.
Distinction Between Combatants and Non-Combatants
The principal argument against the bombardment of cities and
towns is that the non-combatant population will suffer. The Report
of the Commission of Jurists .carefully provides against bombard-
ment when it will endanger civilians who are not within the theatre
of operations. The reason for the prohibition of bombardment
from balloons laid down by the first Hague Conference was based
on the same idea, namely, that non-combatants not connected with
the conflict would suffer. The rules of Naval Warfare and of
Land War are based upon the same principle of humanitarianism.
It has been customary in modern times for the nations to
declare that they were not at war with the people of the enemy
nation, but with the enemy government. A recent example of this
is to be found in President Wilson's War Message to Congress.
Theoretically, this may be true, but it is hardly necessary to point
out that the German Government survived only as the agent of the
German people, that they supported it industrially as well as in
a military way, and that they were compelled to suffer the economic
coercion of the British naval blockade necessary to force their gov-
ernment, as their agency, to sue for peace. The works of Grotius
reveal no such distinction between the government and its people,
and there is no evidence that the armies of Wallenstein, Gustavus
Adolphus, Turenne, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great were
taught to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. 5 7
In early civilization the only distinction was between those
capable and those not capable of bearing arms, by reason of sex,
age, or physical disability. Every man was expected to go to the
defense of his country.58 In Ancient Greece, warfare was char-
acterized by merciless fighting, the taking of few prisoners, the
killing of prisoners in cold blood, the selling of men, women, and
children into slavery, and the habitual laying waste of the lands
of the enemy. 9 As compared with ancient warfare, that of mod-
57. W. P. Morras, loc. cit., p. 165.
58. Premiere Partie, "Usages of War," in the Quarterly Review, 1871,
130:472.
59. H. R. James, "Usages of War in Ancient Greece," in the Edin-
burgh Review, Jan., 1918, p. 77. Helen H. Law, "Atrocities in Greek War-
fare," in the Classical Journal, Dec., 1919, pp. 132-147.
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ern times is much more humane. However, the reasons for both
may probably be based on the exigencies of the differing military
situations, or sociological development.
Historically there seems to be no other conclusion but that
there has never been a distinction made between combatants and
non-combatants, except as was justified by military circumstances.
Commanders of military and naval forces have never hesitated to
destroy private property and devastate the lands of the enemy when
the military situation permitted and demanded it."0 Sherman's
march through the South in the Civil War is an example of this.,'
In the Great War every belligerent was compelled to restrict
consumption of certain products and to regulate all articles service-
able in war, as well as the raw materials from which these articles
were made. This was particularly true of Germany, due to the
British naval blockade."2 Conscribing merchantmen and mounting
guns on them was equivalent to violation of the Declaration of
Paris. The same was true in the cases of the mining industry and
others which were necessary to support the manufacture of muni-
tions and supply fuel for factories. Among the citizenry certain
persons, such as fishermen, cattle-breeders, farmers, and technicians,
had to be kept out of the army to continue their civilian occupations
in support of the military organization. 3
One of the reasons for the existence and maintenance of Ger-
many's enormois fighting machinery was the previous fostering by
that state of its industrial resources.6 4  Germany was so situated
geographically that she had to be virtually independent as far as
industrial necessaries were concerned. One of the first steps taken
by the British Navy was to establish a sort of quasi-blockade of
Germany which was already practically surrounded by enemies on
the land. However, in addition to the blockade, agreements were
reached with neutral interests which resulted in stopping a great
deal of trade to Germany before shipping ever took place. The
60. J. M. Spaight, "The Doctrine of Air-Force Necessity," in the
British Yearbook of International Law, 1925, p. 3.
61. Liddel Hart, Decisive Wars of History, 1929, pp. 130-133.
62. G. Blanchon, The New Warfare, translated by Fred Rothwell,
1917, p. 55.
63. Ibid., pp. 49, 53.
64. The Tariff Commission (London), "The War and British Economic
Policy," 1918, p. 34. "It is now generally recognized that the naval and
military organization of Germany could never have been brought to the
point of perfection which has been reached in recent years and evidenced
since war began, had it not been for the national recognition in that coun-
try of the close connection between economic and defensive policy, and the
unceasing care with which the resources of the State have been used to
foster these great industries."
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agreements were generally reached with representative neutral mer-
chants or shippers. The underlying principle was that the consignees
or shippers would guarantee not to permit the goods imported into
neutral countries to be delivered to Germany.65 The agreements
were, of course, voluntary but were advantageous to the neutral
shipper since he thereby avoided the risk of seizure and confisca-
tion or lengthy detention. Furthermore, Great Britain was able
to hold the blockade, not only with much less difficulty and expense,
but without incurring the enmity of neutral countries.
However, large quantities of foodstuffs and other commodities
continued to reach Germany until the United States became a bel-
ligerent. 6 With the most important neutral nation on the side of
the Allies, Great Britain was able to tighten her blockade grip.
Germany's economic resources were so drained by 1918 that she
could no longer continue the war except by the last desperate mili-
tary offensive on the western front. When this failed, the morale
of the German nation reached an inevitable collapse."'
"Under modern conditions of transportation and large-scale
machine production it is possible for a nation to throw its entire
productive energy into the fight. The victory depends not only
upon placing in the field soldiers who are most valorous, but also
upon turning out the most destructive shells in quantities sufficient
to deluge any or all parts of the enemy's line at will, the largest
quantity of railway equipment and auto trucks with which to make
its artillery and infantry more mobile than those of the enemy, the
largest quantity of airplanes with which to observe the enemy's
movements, to bomb him behind his lines, and to bring down the
planes which serve him for similar purposes. The world supply
of coal and metals is concentrated upon these tasks; therefore one
must add the building of merchant ships, transports, and a navy as
instruments required for the transportation of raw materials and
the finished products of munitions industries as well as men from
all parts of the world. The successful accomplishment of this por-
tion of the military program demands the diversion to munitions
industries, including shipping, of millions of workers and of great
quantities of all sorts of raw materials and products in the early
stages of manufacture which would otherwise have been consumed
in various ways by the civilian population. At the same time the
transfer of men to the army and to munitions industries, the di-
65. J. M. Spaight, Aircraft and Commerce in War, 1926, pp. 73-87.
66. Ibid., pp. 75-76, 81.
67. Liddel Hart, op. cit., pp. 208-231. F. Maurice, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
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version of materials from the manufacture of farming implements
to munitions, the devastation of fertile lands by the armies, and
the exigencies of the shipping situation all serve to make the prob-
lems of feeding and clothing the civilian population-which is
manning the munitions industries-of paramount importance." ' s
General Summerall recognized the importance of economic sup-
port by the civilians at home when he said: "Unless the country
as a whole accepts the fundamental proposition that the entire
United States will prosecute a war with the same spirit of self-
sacrifice as the sailors and soldiers, the accountability for failure
cannot be laid to the armed forces."6 9
Conscription systems which have been recently initiated by
several of the major powers indicate a general acceptance of the
fact, that, in future large wars, civilians must contribute practically
as much as the armed forces. The French Chamber of Deputies
passed an act in 1928 corresponding with the general view of the
importance of war-time industrial and social mobilization. The
act provided that all French citizens not soldiers could be utilized
for the national defense according to their qualifications, without
distinction of age or sex.7 1 In Italy recently a bill was introduced
by the Minister of War which proposed putting all citizens and
factors of production at the disposal of authorities during hostili-
ties so as to lend support to moral, intellectual and material ac-
tivities, to reduce expenditure and consumption, to prevent acts
tending to weaken the resistance of the country, and to comman'1
implicit obedience. The bill provided for compulsory service by
all civilians, regardless of sex, between the ages of fourteen and
seventy, and also for service by all public and private industries and
organizations.' 1 In the United States the plan for direct control
of industries is to place officers in charge who have received spe-
cial training during peace-time as Reserve Officers. Under this
plan many industrialists have accepted commissions in the Organ-
ized Reserve Corps. 7 2
Considering the economic structure of a nation during a mod-
ern war and the conscriptive systems which will probably be em-
68. C. E. Ayres, "The Dependence of War Upon Economic Organiza-
tion," in Readings in the Economics of War (Edited by Clark, Hamilton,
and Moulton), 1919, p. 99.
69. Chicago Herald-Examiner, Sept. 29, 1927.
70. Chicago Daily News, Feb. 9, 1928.
71. Chicago Daily Tribune, May 9, 1931.
72. Chicago Evening American, March 20, 1931. A. B. Quinton, Jr.,
War Planning and Industrial Mobilization, in the Harvard Business Review,
Oct., 1930, pp. 8-17.
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ployed by all nations, it is difficult to determine whether the civilian
who helps supply the fighting forces is any less dangerous to the
success of the opposing army than the soldier who operates the
mechanical instruments of destruction. The situation seems almost
analogous to the ordinary case at common law where A gives B a
weapon, or the means to obtain one, and in turn B promises to kill
C. Clearly A is no less at fault than is B.
Not only does history discredit the idea of a distinction be-
tween combatants and non-combatants, but when a distinction has
been made it has not been for the benefit of the non-combatant, and
modern indications are that the non-combatant in the future will be-
come embroiled in a major conflict more than ever before. Log-
ically, there is no reason to regard him as less an offender than
the soldier, or sailor or airman who wields the weapons of de-
struction
V.
Potentialities of Aerial Bombardment
The ultimate object of a war is the establishment of peace on
satisfactory terms. The means, however, with which to accomplish
this end are in dispute. One hundred and twenty years ago Clause-
witz outlined three principal objects in the conduct of War :7 "(a)
To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force. (b) To get
possession of material elements of aggression. (c) To gain public
opinion. (2) To attain the first of these objects, the chief opera-
tion must be directed against the enemy's principal Army, or at
least against a very important portion of the hostile force; for it
must be beaten before we can follow up the other two objects with
success." This is the view taken by the orthodox military and naval
men.7 4  The testimony of Major-General C. P. Summerall in the
Hearings of the President's Aircraft Board in 1925 is illustrative :75
"We hear much said about enemies bombing our cities. I do not
understand that in war it is in accordance with the laws or rules
of war to bomb cities or areas occupied by non-combatants. My
impression of the fortification of our harbors was that they were
fortified not to keep our cities from being shelled by an enemy's
fleet and transports, thus making them a base for operations against
-our citizens. I do not believe that we are preparing to bomb enemy
73. Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
74. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and the Cities, 1930, pp. 110-112.
75. Quoted by Spaight in his Air Power and the Cities, 1930, p. 8, from
Hearings of the President's Aircraft Board (Morrow Board), Washington,
1925, I, 1231, 1235.
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cities occupied by non-combatants and defenseless people. . As far
as we are concerned, in war the only object is the enemy's army.
I do not believe that civilized war in which we may be
engaged is going to attack undefended cities and kill women and
children. If our enemy does that, while it will be sad for us, it will
bring about his defeat all the quicker . . . The objective has
always been and always will be the enemy's army. If that falls,
everything falls."
In spite of the view that the enemy's army presents the primary
objective, the General Staff of the United States Army in 1929 laid
plans before the President for the expenditure of $13,000,000 for
permanent anti-aircraft defenses for the principal inland cities, ex-
plaining that coastal defenses are useless as a protection t6 the
interior since the development of aeronautical warfare during the
Great War." The General Staff evidently realizes, even though
the United States now enjoys comparative isolation, that enemy air-
planes will be able to reach our inland cities in spite of the existence
of coastal defenses and a field army. Otherwise, the expenditure
of huge sums of money at this early date would, obviously, be
wasteful. This indicates not only that civilians are liable to attack
from the air, but that previous conceptions of the theatre of opera-
tions during a war are undergoing changes. The establishment of
inland defenses requires a great withdrawal of troops and materiel
from the field forces which would otherwise occupy the front lines,
as in the Great War. No doubt large armies will exist in the fu-
ture, but it is likely that they will be smaller than in the last great
conflict, due to the necessity of inland defenses and the augmenta-
tion of the air forces. It will be remembered that the old test of
"undefended" was employed in the Hague rules. The establishment
of permanent anti-aircraft defenses for inland cities clearly makes
those cities defended under the old test and hence liable to attack,
because the theatre of operations, which formerly was supposed
to occupy only that area within the vicinity of troop movements,
has undergone a change, and now each defended city presents a
separate individual theatre of operations.
The science of war can be divided into what is called grand
strategy, strategy, and tactics. Grand strategy is the combining
of all instruments available to a country in enforcing its national
policy, and should so regulate their use as to secure a future pros-
perous state of peace.7 7 War is merely one of the instruments of
76. Chicago Herald-Examiner, June 24, 1929.
77. Liddel Hart, op. cit., p. 150. F. Maurice, op. cit., p. 63.
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national policy which takes up the sword in place of the pen.71
Strategy, in its narrow sense, means "the distribution and trans-
mission of military" means to fulfil the ends of policy."79  Tactics
is the state of war in which the military instrument merges into
actual fighting.8" An example of grand strategy has been observed
in the Great War where the Allied naval blockade, trade agree-
ments with neutrals, ,and the spreading of propaganda unfavorable
to Germany among neutral countries brought about the collapse
of German power although she still had a great army in the field.
In future major conflicts there is every reason to suppose that
military aviation may be used against the internal organs of an
enemy nation in strategical cooperation with a naval blockade
in order to hasten the final submission of that nation.
In the Great War the multitude of troops on the battle-front
compelled the commanders on both sides to concentrate upon the
development of the ground situation. Accordingly, bombardment
airplanes were used to enhance the effectiveness of the ground
forces. It was only, however, during the intensive ground fighting
of 1916 that the immediate tactical situation predominated and all
aviation units were used in its support."' But it was recognized
that the full effect of military aviation was not gained in that
manner, and that it could aid most by disrupting lines of com-
munication in the rear areas and by destroying factories and air-
planes on the ground.8 2  This employment of military aviation
is strategy in the strict sense of the term for, according to Napo-
leon's dictum, the secret of war lies in its communications. "The
line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an
army as the heart to the life of a human being."88  Bombardment
aviation occupies the same position with relation to the ground
forces as does the navy which is a strategic weapon used to ameli-
78. Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 130.
79. Liddel Hart, op. cit. See G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War
(1916 Malcom ed.), pp. 39-40.
80. Liddel Hart, op. cit.
81. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 5.
82. Ibid., p. 7.
83. G. F. R. Henderson, op. cit. "Just as the duellist who finds his
adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard
astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's movements, and to con-
tent himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose com-
munications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and
he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split tip his
force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior
numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where
defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the sur-
render of his whole army."
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orate the military situation for the land forces. At the same time,
the navy and the air force each has its own system of tactics for
carrying out its respective missions." The aerial bombardment
branch of the air force is its basic arm, and there is a necessary
degree of coordination between it and the observation and combat
branches.8" Each branch in turn has its own distinct system of
offensive and defensive tactics, just as do the troops on the ground
and the ships of war at sea.
Those who have advanced the orthodox view that the opposing
army presents the primary objective and that the air forces will
not attack cities and towns remote from the theatre of ground
operations have evidently considered that the opposing army means
the hostile ground force. If, by the opposing army, they mean
the hostile air force and anti-aircraft, then the orthodox view would
seem to be very nearly correct. However, the tactical situation at
which the air force aims is not the defeat or route of the hostile
air force, but is the control of the air. As long as the enemy has
a single plane he is still relatively free to travel through the air,
in spite of the strength of the opposing air force, and has a reason-
ably good chance of reaching an objective. Therein lies the differ-
ence between the air forces and the ground forces. The latter
have it in their power to absolutely prevent enemy troops from
getting through to objectives behind the lines, while the air forces
can never be sure that enemy airplanes will not get through. Thus,
the conclusion is reached that civilians will be liable to bombard-
ment attack, and enemy airplanes can reach them even when the
enemy air force is technically defeated, that is, when it does not
have control of the air.
VI.
Accuracy in Aerial Bombing
There was much inaccuracy in bombing during the Great War,
due to crude implements, and the result was a great amount of
injury to non-combatants and destruction of private property within
fairly wide areas surrounding the objectives. In future warfare
there will be a greater percentage of hits, due to technical im-
provements in bombing equipment, but errors will always be pres-
ent to a certain extent. In 1915 the introduction of pursuit air-
planes compelled the aerial bombardment units on both sides to
84. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 76.
85. Ibid.
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continue their operations under cover of darkness because of the
heavy casualties suffered in daylight operations.88 Due to poor
visibility at night the bombing errors were numerous. Under pres-
ent conditions the same result will necessarily be attained, particu-
larly by the side which does not have control of the air, since it
will be unable to operate in the daytime and must resort to the
cover of darkness. Normally in daylight bombing operations the
airplanes fly in formations of not less than seven8 7 and probably
not more than forty. These formations are for the purpose of
giving reasonable assurance of the successful culmination of their
missions, and for the mutual protection of the planes therein.
Generally they will be used to attack precision targets of narrow
dimensions which will not be attacked at night unless daytime at-
tack is impossible. Broad area targets will normally be attacked
at night, when the missions will be conducted by individual planes.
Sometimes several will strike simultaneously. Formations at night
are inadvisable because navigation lights are necessary on dark
nights, and formations, even without lights, are more easily seen
from the ground on bright moonlight nights than are single planes.
Besides, the necessary dispersion of bombs dropped is obtained as
easily by individual bombing as by formation bombing. At night
bombing from high altitudes may be made more accurate by the
use of parachute flares, with delay apparatus for lighting them,
which will illuminate wide areas beneath them.8
Whenever possible bombardment airplanes will probably seek
the higher altitudes, since they will thereby be afforded greater
safety from anti-aircraft artillery and will be in a more advanta-
geous position with relation to hostile pursuit airplanes. At great
heights objects on the ground naturally appear very small and in-
distinct, even on a clear day. This will increase the error in
bombing, as also will the currents of air the bombs encounter on
the way down.
A great many objectives, such as factories, will be found in the
midst of thickly populated and built-up cities. A flight over New
York City, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Los Angeles, or
even a smaller city, is all that is necessary to convince one of the
great difficulty in even distinguishing where the target is located,
although its exact location may have been previously determined
on a map or aerial photograph. Add to this the fact that the pilot
86. Ibid., p. 4.
87. Ibid., p. 81.
88. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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will probably be fighting for his life while trying to get into position
to bomb the target, and it is plainly evident that indiscriminate
bombing cannot be avoided within the immediate vicinity of the
objective. Cities of vital importance will seldom be unprotected
by anti-aircraft artillery or pursuit airplanes.
Low altitude flights will usually be made by bombardment air-
planes only when, due to meteorological conditions, high altitudes
cannot be reached. There are several advantages to low flying,
although there is the disadvantage that the morale of the bombing
personnel will be seriously impaired, since they know that if the
pilot is killed or disabled they will probably all die in the crash
which is certain to follow, because they will be too close to the
ground to be able to use their parachutes for escape.
Below an altitude of twenty thousand feet the danger from
anti-aircraft fire and attack by pursuit planes increases, unless ex-
tremely low altitudes are resorted to and the planes fly barely
above the tree tops. At such low altitude the danger from anti-
aircraft and machine gun fire is practically eliminated, because the
planes are going so fast and are so close that the ground guns
cannot be trained on them. Also attack by pursuit planes is ren-
dered less effective because their superiority depends on the speed
attained in a dive. They must start to pull up out of the dive, how-
ever, several hundred feet above the ground in order to avoid
crashing. Consequently, by the time they have reached the low-
flying bombers they are practically on the same level with them
and are without much greater speed, thus presenting excellent tar-
gets to the gunners aboard the bombardment airplanes.
It would seem that with the planes flying at low altitudes the
accuracy in bombing should increase. However, unless the bomb
is equipped with an instantaneous fuse or an arresting device when
dropped, it will roll across the ground for an undetermined dis-
tance. If an instantaneous fuse is used the plane itself will be
destroyed, since it will still be within the effective range of the
bomb when it explodes. To prevent this, a delay of at least fifteen
seconds is necessary for the plane to get beyond the danger area."'
During this time the bomb may roll entirely away from the target.
In tests conducted by the Air Corps in 1927 a bridge, present-
ing a target four hundred feet wide, was bombed by highly trained
personnel from an altitude of six thousand feet. They expected 11
per cent hits based on calculations as to the probable error. The
89. Ibid., pp. 116-117.
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observed hits were 27 per cent of the bombs dropped.90 Even
under these conditions, where the bombs are dropped from a rela-
tively low altitude and by especially trained personnel, a great ma-
jority of them will hit only in the vicinity of the objective.
Cloudy weather is another cause for inaccuracy in bombing.
During the Great War there were innumerable cases where the
bombs were dropped and the airmen reported that observations
were impossible or difficult because of adverse weather conditions.'
Danger to nof-combatants will inevitably result from the ex-
plosion of the bombs even though they hit fairly close to the target.
The most effective bomb against materiel is the demolition bomb
which ranges in standard sizes from 100 pounds to 2000 pounds.
The destructive effect is produced by the detonation of the high
-explosive content, which is usually T. N. T. When detonation
takes place above the ground, fragments are thrown at high speed
further than the effectiveness of the blast, but within a limiting
radius the blast is far more effective than the fragments.9 2 The
maximum danger radius from fragments ranges from one thousand
to two thousand yards. But the percentage of personnel which will
be hit at ranges of 500, 1000, and 2000 yards is very small, prob-
ably averaging from .5 per cent to 2 per cent. The blast effect on
personnel ranges from 40 feet for the 100 pound bomb to 110 feet
for the 2000 pound bomb. It is not properly used, however, when
applied against personnel,9 1 as special fragmentation bombs are
available for that purpose.
From the foregoing, the conclusion is obvious that anyone or
anything within the immediate vicinity of a bombardment objective
will be in imminent danger of destruction.
VII.
Objectives of Vital Military Importance
Judging from the results of bombing operations during the
Great War and the present economic development due to mechan-
ized warfare,94 the logical objectives in the future will be those
places vital to a nation in maintaining and producing war materiel.
90. Ibid., p. 67.
91. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, 1924, p. 223.
92. Miscellaneous Ammunition-Bombs for Aircraft, War Department,
TR 1370-G, Oct. 25, 1930, p. 8.
93. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 47.
94. F.. Maurice, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
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The Report of the American Aviation Commission to Congress,
1920, says: "It has been proved within the experience of every
nation engaged in the war (1914-18) that two years or more of
high pressure effort have been needed to achieve the quantity pro-
duction of aircraft, aircraft engines, and accessory equipment. The
training of personnel, including engineering, production, inspection,
maintenance and operating forces-consisting of some 50 distinct
trades and some 75 industries-has proved itself a stupendous task
when undertaken upon the basis of war emergency alone."95 If
seventy-five industries are required for the support of aeronautics
alone, then there are hundreds of others necessary for all of the
other military activities, and each has its essential supporting in-
dustries upon which it is dependent for raw material or parts. The
whole mass in turn is supported by the producers of food and other
commodities for the consumption both of civilian workers and the
fighting forces. It has been suggested that merely because the
Great War involved so much of the economic element, there is no
reason to believe that wars in the future will necessarily be depend-
ent upon economic organization. 6 This might be true if the meth-
ods of warfare consisted mainly of hand to hand combat. How-
ever, warfare has developed into combat, not between individuals
merely, but between machines of complicated designs which are
controlled by men who are not, strictly speaking, personally en-
gaged in the fighting. "The successful nation is the one which
can invent new weapons of offense faster than the enemy can de-
vise means of defense and at the same time protect itself not too
tardily from the new offensive weapons of the enemy." 7
It is almost impossible to determine in every case whether
an objective is of vital military importance or not. Very often it
will depend on immediately surrounding circumstances. There are,
however, certain objectives which are obviously essential to military
operations and which are undisputably legitimate targets for aerial
bombardment. The troops, both reserve and those on the battle-
front, in armed defensive and in armed offensive positions wherever
they may be found; artillery; ammunition dumps; supply depots;
tanks and armored cars; airplanes on the ground; railroads lead-
ing to the troops; railroad rolling stock; highways used in supplying
the troops; water supplies for the troops; vehicles on the highways;
95. Squadron Leader, op. cit., pp. 23-24. See also Aeronautics Trade
Directory, Aeronautics Bulletin No. 3, U. S. Department of Commerce,
Aeronautics Brajnch, July 1, 1930.
96. Elbridge Colby, loc. cit., p. 320.
97. C. E. Ayres, loc. cit., p. 102.
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electric power lines supplying electricity to the troops; telephone
and telegraph lines; radio stations; and any other objects, the de-
struction of which will tend to weaken the resistance or offensive
power of the troops, all fall within the category of targets which
should be legitimate objects of aerial bombardment.
In view of the need for machinery in the conduct of a war,
other targets, disconnected from the troops themselves, have be-
come just as important to the strength of the armed forces as the
equipment with which they fight. Factories which provide airplanes
are just as vital as the airplanes themselves, which are clearly
legitimate targets when close to the line of battle. The same is true
of factories manufacturing ammunition and armaments. Each of
these factories is dependent upon certain raw products or manu-
factured parts. For example, airplanes for war use must be
equipped with instruments. Therefore, instrument factories will
be proper objectives. They also require motors, which are manu-
factured separately from the airplanes. The motors require the
separate production of ignition and carburetion equipment. The
structure of a plane must be built of special metals which must
be provided by metal works. Cloth is generally used to cover the
airplane structure, thus requiring the cooperation of linen mills.
The cloth, when applied, must be especially treated with dope which
is manufactured by paint factories. The propellors, whether made
of wood or of steel, are made by separate factories. Similarly,
wheels, brakes, and tires are all produced by different industries.
The wings are usually made of wooden ribs and spars which can
only be obtained from high grade special wood supplied by a large
number of enterprises in the lumber business. In order to assemble
all these materials and parts, transportation facilities are necessary.
Therefore, railroads, rolling stock of railroads, terminal points,
highways, and trucks become vital outside the military area of op-
erations.
Other war machinery will be similarly dependent upon rail and
highway transportation, and a vast number of industries, such as
those mentioned in regard to the manufacture of airplanes, will
be called upon to supply the necessary parts and raw materials.
The most outstanding of these are armament factories. Blast fur-
naces and iron works will be essential in supplying iron products
used in war and in machinery to make war weapons. The steel
works will be of utmost necessity to provide material for the manu-
facturers of guns and practically every armament used in warfare.
Mines producing nearly every kind of metal will be worked under
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high pressure for raw materials necessary in manufacturing war
materials. The oil fields, oil tanks, and oil and gas pipe-lines will
all be supplying heat, fuel, and lubricants to the industries produc-
ing war materials. Water-power projects, electric power stations,
lines, and terminal houses will supply power for motors, lights,
telegraph, telephone, radio, electric railroads, and any number of
enterprises, the destruction of Which will be vital to the military
success of the enemy. Even the clothing, the rubber, and the leather
businesses will be called upon to supply materials to clothe the fight-
ing forces, and to provide gas masks and other such equipment.
Dye factories will supply coloring for clothing and for camouflaging
war equipment. The paint industries will provide paints with
which metal and wooden parts must be covered to prevent corrosion
and decay. Chemical factories can easily be converted into de-
structive gas producers. Granaries and warehouses contain pro-
duce which, if not destroyed, will be used by the fighting forces.
There are many other industries, too numerous to mention, which
would directly contribute to the support of the conduct of war.
These are given as illustrative of the immense internal structure
of industry which is as vital to the success of the opposing forces
as are the field armies themselves. Practically all such industries
and facilities as those suggested above were considered important
objectives during the Great War and, accordingly, suffered from
aerial bombardment. 8
There is more doubt about certain other objectives being con-
sidered vital to the military situation. A list of these follows, by
way of illustration: the homes of workers in the vital industries,
factories producing food for the consumption of both civilians and
the armed forces, factories producing articles having practically no
value to the military forces, farms, orchards, cotton plantations,
cattle ranches, and other places the bombardment of which would
merely result in obstructing economic organization to a slight ex-
tent and terrorizing a portion, if not all, of the civilian population.
There are a few objects which, among civilized nations, are
never considered legitimate prey for destruction during war-time.
These include monuments, places of public worship, charitable in-
stitutions, and hospitals. The rules of war already in existence will
protect these places whenever possible. The intentional destruction
of them would bring down the wrath not only of the nations to
which they belonged, but also of neutral countries and individuals
everywhere, including the citizens of the State which would resort
98. J. M. Spaight, op. cit., pp. 226-235.
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to that type of warfare. An example of atrocious conduct some-
what similar to the killing of wounded in hospitals is to be found
in the war between China and Japan. The Chinese generals offered
rewards for the heads of Japanese generals, and for the hands and
heads of prisoners. This resulted in hideous slaughters of non-
combatant Chinese by the infuriated Japanese soldiers who other-
wise observed the rules of war as adopted in Europe.99
The doubtful group of objectives previously mentioned seem to
be too indirectly connected with the production of war machinery
to warrent the economic use of aerial bombardment against them.
They are mainly those which support the great mass of civilians
who have little connection with the conflict. It would be wasteful
to drop bombs upon such places, because these same bombs could
be used to much greater advantage on places of vital military
importance.
Another reason for not bombing these so-called doubtful ob-
jectives is that they form the very framework of the economic and
social organization of the nation. War is merely an instrument of
policy which is used when everything else fails in diplomatic inter-
course between nations. Grand strategy makes use of war and any
other method to produce one result, namely, ultimate prosperity and
a state of peace. It is not to the interest of any nation to pro-
duce an economic and social upheaval in another country, for there
is too much interdependence, economically, between all the nations
of the world. Each is dependent, to a certain extent, upon each
other country as a market for its products or as a place to pur-
chase products not made at home or raw materials with which
to manufacture articles which in turn may be exported to some
other country. It is a complex scheme of circularization of finance
and produce. This is illustrated by present conditions in all the
civilized countries of the world-all are touched to some extent
by the economic depression. In Germany it has nearly brought
about a state of social collapse as well, and if this comes to pass,
a wave of communism may spread throughout Europe. The na-
tions realize the danger to themselves from this threat to Germany,
and it is significant that the United States, isolated as she has pre-
tended to be, took the initiative in bringing about a debt mora-
torium in Germany's favor, and that France, Germany's traditional
enemy, has considered lending her immense sums of money to re-
99. T. E. Holland, "International Law in the War Between Japan and
China," in the Fortnightly Review, June, 1895, 63:915-916.
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establish her credit and prevent the complete collapse of the Ger-
man nation.
Among the group of doubtful objectives is one which has been
condemned by the Commission of Jurists, 10 but which may pos-
sibly be made an objective in future warfare. Von Hoppner, who
commanded the German Air Forces, and Von Tirpitz have stated
that the reason for the bombardment of London was that it was
the center of the war strength of the Allies and that the objective
was to crush the will of the English people to continue the war.'
The Germans were limited in the amount of aerial bombardment
which they could use in this fashion. The fact is therefore note-
worthy that, "With improved bomb sights, racks, and bombs, it is
apparent that the damage suffered by London throughout the war
did not equal that which could be caused by one heavy bombard-
ment group with modern equipment."'1 2  Fifty-two present day
bombardment airplanes could deliver an equal load in one mission.
However, in spite of this capacity to deliver attacks on large cities
without regard to a vital military objective, it is improbable that
such bombardment will be resorted to-the reason being that it
would be a dispersion of effort not justified by the returns. As
has already been pointed out, every city will contain certain ob-
jectives which will be vital and therefore legitimate. It seems
sufficient, therefore, to concentrate on bombing these objectives and,
inasmuch as the cities contain the bulk of the population of most
nations, to accept the natural effect upon the morale of civilians in
the vicinity as sufficient to crush the will of the nation to continue
the war.
Judging from experiences in the Great War and from the plans
of all nations for the conscription of industry in the next major
conflict, it seems certain that those industries which directly aid
in the production, maintenance, supply, or transportation of war
material will be considered vital military objectives and, therefore,
subject to aerial bombardment. It is somewhat difficult to deter-
mine what industries directly aid in military production. However,
it seems that this class would include any enterprise which, within
the period of a few months or even two or three years, would be
capable of producing or aiding in the production of any armament
or equipment for use by the armed forces in strengthening their
defensive resistance or their offensive powers. Any industry which
100. General Report of the Commission of Jurists at the Hague, Article
22, loc. cit.
101. 1. M. Spaight, op. cit., p. 202.
102. Bombardment Aviation, op. cit., p. 13.
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would naturally be included in a national conscription of industry
would, logically, be a military objective.
The capitols and political centers of nations constitute other
vital objectives which do not come under the category of industrial
centers but which, in a way, are related to them, because they gov-
ern their existence and the existence of the armed forces, besides
unifying the efforts of all the civilians and military forces. The
destruction of these places would not be decisive by any means,
but would serve to disrupt the entire organization of the country
and. to demoralize it.
VIII.
Conclusions
In conclusion let us recommend points which should be in-
cluded in suitable rules for aerial bombardment. Bear in mind
that they must be broad and elastic enough that commanders will
not violate them under the exigencies of war, thus opening the door
to reprisals; that they must be few in number so as to be easily
kept in mind; and that they shall be acceptable to all nations, re-
gardless of their varying philosophic views of war and their
policies of national defense. Rules of warfare will only be observed
when they are the products of the enlightend conscience of civil-
ized mankind.
Rules for aerial bombardment should embody the following
principles:
(1) Aerial bombardment must be conducted in a humane
manner with due regard to the lives and property of civilians.
(2) There must be no aerial bombardment for the sole pur-
post of terrorizing the civilian population, although, when objec-
tives vital to the military situation are subjected to bombardment,
terrorization and injury may legitimately result to civilians within
the immediate vicinity.
(3) Places whch are not vital to military success and which
do not serve directly in the production, supply, or transportation
of war materiel or personnel must not be the object of aerial bom-
bardment, but when such places are in the immediate vicinity of
legitimate objectives they are liable to be bombed.
(4) The objectives to be considered vital should include:
armed forces, political centers, and all industries and facilities which
would naturally be included in a national industrial conscription or
mobilization system in time of war.
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(5) Suitable penalties must be provided, which apply to the
commanding officers and to the pilots and bombers alike, and any-
one violating the rules should be treated as a war criminal.
The rules, which may elaborate the foregoing principles, should
be only such as can be considered practicable from every angle.
They should be no more than general guides to the ethical conduct
of aerial bombardment operations. There will be no judges ex-
cept those who are giving or executing the commands, and their
minds will not be functioning normally in the heat of battle. There
will be sufficient tendency to become lax in the enforcement of any
rules, as was experienced in late stages of the Great War when
prisoners were compelled to do work of a military nature, strictly
contrary to the rules of war, and were frequently killed in cold
blood so they would not have to be taken back of the lines in ac-
cordance with the rules. Another example was the use of explosive
bullets, which was in violation of rules of warfare.
Naturally, there will always be some individuals who will vio-
late any rules that could possibly be agreed upon. This is just
as true in times of peace, when every nation has a serious problem
in dealing with its law-breakers. Consequently, we cannot attempt
to make the rules for the benefit of those who will break them
regardless of what they contain. A sufficient deterrent must be
provided for those who will comply with a rule only when they
are placed in personal danger by disregarding it. For this reason
it is recommended in the foregoing list of principles that those
persons who violate the rules shall be treated as war criminals.
The purpose of rules is to guide the belligerents as nations and
to prevent wrongful acts by concerted action. A war is not fought
by the individuals but by the national unities, which, like boxers,
must conform their movements to the principles of fighting, and
in addition must observe such regulations as are commensurate with
good-sportsmanship and as are needful to maintain their own self-
respect and the respect of others.
The conclusions we have reached do not provide for very
much protection to civilian populations, since the greater part there-
of resides in cities where legitimate objectives will be located. Also
the principles suggested leave many loop-holes of which an un-
scrupulous belligerent could take advantage. However, every civil
legal system is elastic to the extent that advantage may be taken of
technicalities by those who will engage in sharp practices.
A curtailment of aerial bombardment by international regula-
tions beyond the principles recommended would create a worse
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situation. Reprisals would become frequent and soon a war would
develop into base barbarity with no rules governing. If reprisals
could be outlawed, then the objection would be withdrawn. But
human nature is such that whenever one opponent resorts to un-
fair tactics the other will retort in the same manner. It is better
to have a few rules that are at least restraining to a slight extent
than to have none at all.
Some writers take the view that rules are useless and that
our civilization is doomed unless war is outlawed entirely. The out-
lawry of war seems to be psychologically impossible. In time of
war any of its instruments become uncontrollable by rules except
when natural influences restrict their use. Just as the Franken-
stein monster pursued its maker to destruction, so may man-made
machines bring about the destruction of man. However, war has
never been a complete destroyer of peoples.
The purpose of rules of war should be to take cognizance of
all natural influences and attempt to alleviate as much injury and
destruction as possible.
